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As we write for the benefit of the parties alone, who are familiar with the1
facts and procedural history of this case, we confine our discussion to the legal issues
presented and include only those facts necessary to our disposition.  
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  OPINION
                             
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Wissahickon School District (“Wissahickon”) appeals an order requiring
it to provide compensatory education and tuition reimbursement to the parents of Lauren
P.  (“plaintiffs”).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in part and reverse in part.
I.
Lauren P. (“Lauren”) suffers from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder,
anxiety, depression, and learning disabilities.   Her disabilities, in turn, render her more1
susceptible to behavioral and motivation problems.  Lauren attended school in the
Wissahickon School District through September 2003.  
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) requires that a state
receiving federal education funding provide a “free appropriate public education”
(“FAPE”) to disabled children.  20 U.S.C. § 1412(1).  School districts design and
administer a program of individualized instruction that is set forth in an Individualized
3Education Plan (“IEP”) in order to provide a FAPE.  20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).  The IEP must
confer “significant learning” and “meaningful benefit” on the child, and this standard is
“gauged in relation to the child’s potential.”  Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate
Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 182–85 (3d Cir. 1988). 
In November 2001, Wissahickon developed an IEP for the remainder of Lauren’s
ninth grade year (2001–2002) to address deficiencies in writing, math, reading, and
organizational and study skills.  It subsequently developed IEPs for Lauren’s tenth and
eleventh grade school years, which were from 2002–2003 and 2003–2004, respectively. 
In September 2003, plaintiffs unilaterally removed Lauren from Wissahickon and
enrolled her in the Delaware Valley Friends School (“DVFS”).  
In February 2004, plaintiffs requested a due process hearing pursuant to 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.507 and sought compensatory education for Lauren’s ninth and tenth grade school
years and tuition reimbursement for her eleventh grade school year.  Upon the conclusion
of the hearing, the Hearing Officer denied all relief to the plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs
appealed this decision to the Pennsylvania Special Education Appeals Panel (“Appeals
Panel”).  The Appeals Panel affirmed in part and reversed in part, awarding compensatory
education for part of Lauren’s tenth grade school year but denying plaintiffs’ request for
tuition reimbursement. 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in September 2005 in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania challenging the final decision of the Appeals Panel.  Wissahickon filed a
counterclaim, and both parties moved for summary judgment.  In its decision, the District
Neither the Appeals Panel nor the District Court awarded compensatory2
education for Lauren’s ninth grade year.  Plaintiffs have not appealed this issue to this
Court.   
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. 3
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
4
Court awarded compensatory education for most of Lauren’s tenth grade year and tuition
reimbursement for her eleventh grade year at DVFS.   Wissahickon challenges this2
decision in this Court.3
II.  
 In the event that a student has been denied a FAPE, a court may award
compensatory education to account for the period the student was deprived of this right. 
Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 536 (3d Cir. 1995).  The right to a
compensatory education “accrue[s] from the point that the school district knows or should
know of the IEP’s failure.”  Id.  
In this case, the Hearing Officer concluded that Wissahickon provided Lauren a
FAPE during her ninth and tenth grade years given the level of support and instruction
offered and that the IEPs “were implemented as written.”  The Appeals Panel reversed. 
The Panel found that distractability was part of Lauren’s disability, that this disability
affected her entire school day, and that the school had notice that her IEP was not
working.  
When reviewing this decision, the District Court must make its “own findings by a
preponderance of the evidence,” while also “afford[ing] ‘due weight’ to the ALJ’s
5determination.”  Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Ed. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir.
2004).  The “due weight” standard requires the court to consider the “[f]actual findings
from the administrative proceedings . . . prima facie correct” and, if the court fails to
adhere to those facts, explain why.  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  In
a case such as this one, where the hearing officer and appeals panel reached contrary
decisions, a district court gives “due weight” to the factual findings of the appeals panel
rather than those of the hearing officer when those findings are based on the evidentiary
record.  Carlisle Area Sch., 62 F.3d at 529.  Furthermore, the district court gives “due
weight” to the “appeals panel’s decision when it reverses the hearing officer’s
conclusions of law, inferences from proven facts, and factual findings based on credibility
judgments where non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence justified the appeals panel’s contrary
decision.”  Id.   
The District Court reached the same decision as the Appeals Panel on the issue of
compensatory education for Lauren’s tenth grade year.  The Court found that
Wissahickon (1) knew or should have known that Lauren’s behavioral problems were
impeding her education, (2) recognized that the IEP was inadequate, and (3) addressed
Lauren’s behavior in a piecemeal fashion rather than through a consistent behavior
management plan.  We now exercise plenary review over the legal standards used by the
District Court and its legal conclusions.  Lauren W. v. Deflaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 266 (3d
Cir. 2007); Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Ed., 381 F.3d at 199.  We review the District
Court’s factual findings for clear error.  Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Ed., 381 F.3d at
6199.  
Applying this standard of review, we will not disturb the District Court’s factual
findings or legal conclusions as they relate to compensatory education for Lauren’s tenth
grade year.  Though we recognize that Wissahickon made a good-faith effort to design an
educational program that would benefit Lauren, the record demonstrates that by
December 2002 her behavioral problems were impeding her ability to learn. 
Wissahickon’s failure to address these behavioral problems in a systematic and consistent
way denied Lauren a FAPE.  We will affirm the District Court’s award of compensatory
education. 
III.
Parents who believe that a public school is not providing an appropriate education
may unilaterally remove the child from that school, place him/her in another school, and
seek tuition reimbursement for the cost of the alternate placement.  20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(c); Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374 (1985).  A
court may grant tuition reimbursement if two elements are met: (1) the student’s IEP must
be inappropriate; and (2) the private placement must be proper.  Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.
v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 248 (3d Cir.1999).  The plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating
both elements.  Andrew M. v. Del. County Office of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation, 490 F.3d 337, 345 (3d Cir. 2007); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 172 F.3d at 248. 
We disagree with the District Court that DVFS was a proper placement.  The
Appeals Panel found that DVFS was not a proper placement because it “[did] not
7sufficiently address Student’s on-going needs in assignment completion, distraction
moving to and from class, losing assignments, not completing assignments, and so forth.” 
The District Court discounted this, arguing that the Panel “did not explain further its
conclusion or cite to the record for support.”  Yet the Court also recognized that the
“DVFS IEP did not address Lauren’s behavioral problems” and the Court further found
“indications of the inappropriateness of Lauren’s private placement” in the record. 
Nonetheless, it awarded tuition reimbursement based on the fact that DVFS’s educational
plan for Lauren acknowledged and tried to address problems such as Lauren’s low self-
esteem, lack of confidence, and auditory processing difficulties. 
As stated previously, a district court is required to explain its decision to reject
administrative findings.  The District Court failed to do so in this instance.  It did not
point to any evidence in the record that undermined the Appeals Panel’s finding that
DVFS failed to adequately address some of Lauren’s most critical behavioral problems. 
Instead, the District Court appears to have reached a contrary decision based upon its
weighing of this failure against what it perceived as strengths in the DVFS educational
plan.  The outcome of such a weighing, however, must be based upon a preponderance of
the evidence.  Lauren’s primary behavioral difficulties were distractability and
assignment completion.  The failure of the DVFS educational plan to address these
problems could not be overcome by a recognition of Lauren’s low self-esteem and a
generalized school curriculum built around small class sizes.  When we afford due weight
to the Appeals Panel’s finding in this case that DVFS was not a proper placement, we see
8no basis on which to overturn that determination.  The District Court erred by failing to
heed the “due weight” standard and by awarding tuition reimbursement.  We will reverse
the District Court’s grant of tuition reimbursement for Lauren’s eleventh grade year at
DVFS.  
